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DAVID HUME,
"OFTHE
STANDARD OF TASTE,"
AND
ESTHETIC THEORY
James W. Mock

he received opinion in aesthetics has long held Kant's
f
theory to be the greatest achievement of the eigh^
teenth century. David Hume's was relegated to a
lowly status, seen merely as an example of the taste faculty theorizing
common to the era. The standard take on Hume, therefore, tended
toward the perfunctory. In 1988, for example, in what I consider to be
a very fine aesthetics survey text, Marcia Eaton notes that "Hume
argued that taste is a...faculty analogous to the seuses...and that
judgments of taste therefore have the same empirical foundation as do
judgments about what we see or hear."' Eaton's six-sentence coverage
was much better and more extensive than average: many introductory
texts cover Hume, if at all, in a single sentence listing influences on

' Marcia Mulder Eaton, Baiic Issues in Aesthetia (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1988), 36.
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Kant.^ It would be safe to say that until recently there was scant
interest in Hume's work in general, and "Of the Standard of Taste" in
particular. It was not totally neglected, but it was not adequately
recognized as a significant and promising achievement. Simon Blackbum, one of those who did recognize the achievement in his 1984
monograph on the philosophy of language, used Hume's work to
combat the drift to relativism. Blackburn says that "The classic
introduction to the problem is Hume's superb and neglected essay 'Of
the Standard of Taste.'"' At almost the same time, Peter Kavy claimed
that "It should be a source of deep regret to philosophers of art"' that
Hume's theory was not fully fleshed out. The power of Hume's
thought, Kivy stated, "would have given the young discipline of
aesthetics the firm philosophical footing it required in the Englishspeaking world,"' a footing he saw as only being achieved a couple of
centuries later.
Recently, this neglect has been remedied, at least in specialized
philosophical venues. Hume studies are blossoming today, and the
growing appreciation of the "Standard" has been such that George
Dickie, in The Century of Taste, published in 1997, flatly maintains that
Kant's theory of taste "cannot hold a candle to the highly sophisticated
theory of Hume's 'Of the Standard of Taste.'"' Dickie clearly and
forcefully rejects the traditional opinion which saw Hume as a mere
prelude to Kant, and goes so far as to say that Kant's work "derailed the
theory of taste as a philosophical enterprise."^ I can only agree with
Dickie's statement that Hume's work "brought the theory of taste
closer to success than any other attempt before or after."'
In 2001, in harmony with Dickie and Kivy, Dabney Townsend
stated that Kant and his followers took aesthetics in a direction different

^ Alben Hofstadter and Richard Kuhn, Philosophies of An and Beauty: Selected Reading from
Plato to Heide^er (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).
' Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word: Grounding in the Philosophy of Lan^ge (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1984), 199.
' Peter Kivy, "Hume's Neighbor's Wife: An Essay on the Evolution of Hume's Aesthetics,"
British journal of Aesthetics 23 (1983), 208.
' Kivy, "Hume's Neighbor's Wife," 208.
' George Dickie, The Century of Taste: The Philosophical Odyssey of Taste in the Eighteenth
Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 114.
' Dickie, The Century of Taste, 123.
' Dickie, The Century of Taste, 123.
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from that indicated by Hume, and that the theories which derived from
Kant's work have not proven to be auspicious. Townsend r1aim«! that
"If a total abandonment of aesthetic theory is not to follow...then
something like Hume's solutions...may still prove useful."' I believe
that it is indeed useful to take all of these claims to heart, to again look
into what Hume had to say in what was not and is still not widely
recognized to be an important achievement in aesthetics, and to
continue the reevaluation of Hume's ideas, both in their historical
context and in their implications for future thinking.
Hume's work appeared in the middle of the period of aesthetic
taste theorizing. This was thirty-two years after Francis Hutcheson's
inaugural work, and thirty-three years before the publication of Kant's
third Critique. Hume's essay is not an entirely original performance. It
rests upon his entire philosophical system, but is derived in part from
Abbe Jean-Baptiste Dubos's Reflexions critiques sur la poesie et sur la
peinture (1719).^° It is obvious that, in his modest twenty-two pages,
Hume cannot develop his thoughts and can only provide a framework
for expansion. Even if we draw upon the references to beauty in the rest
of his writings, especially the Essays Moral and Political, the Treatise of
Human Nature, and the two Enquiries, we will still not have worked out
the implications in detail. But they both can andshould be.I think that,
first, a very brief identification of some of the issues adopted from
Dubos can present a sense of the ideas common in Hume's age that find
their way into his work. I will next turn to a couple of the important
contributions of Hume: the proposal of both an epistemic, cognitive
component and a non-epistemic sensory component of the aesthetic
judgment, and the proposal of a non-destructive relativism of response.
I shall reprise the longstanding linkage between beauty and utility that
is very important in understanding Hume's writings in their historical
context and then close with the beauty of Hume's system as useful, as
being of social value, especially in its avoidance of what Dickie
considers in many of his publications to be a pernicious inheritance
from Kant, the concept of pure aesthetic disinterest.

' Dabney Townsend, Hume's Aesthetic Theory: Taste and Sentiment (New York: Routledge,
2001), 86.
" Peter Jones, "Hume's Literary and Aesthetic Theory," in David Fate Norton, ed., The
Cambridge Companion to Hume (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 259.
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Peter Jones states that almost all of Hume's remarks on the arts
"are set in the framework of our social life"" and identifies this as part
of Hume's debt to Dubos. Following Dubos, Hume observes that
responding properly to an artwork is not a passive process. The
observer must not only self-consciously attend to the work, but also be
in the proper frame of mind. Required for response are, "A perfect
serenity of mind, a recollection of thought, a due attention to the
object."" The three causes of improper response to works of art, lack
of delicacy, lack of good sense, and the suffering from prejudices, are
each "derived verbatim from Dubos,"" and would have been perfectly
familiar to Hume's educated contemporaries. For both, overcoming
failures in response resulting from prejudices or lack of delicacy or lack
of good sense requires practice and comparison." Hume is said to
follow Dubos on the topic of variations within agreed upon judgments,
and on the explanations of these variations as the result of psychological
facts about individuals and social facts about communities."
Hume's general position on taste is that it is the source of
judgments of both natural and moral beauty, and is the foundation of
criticism. In the "Standard," he opens by acknowledging the inescapable
reality of divergences of taste and opinion, and notes that the variety of
taste is, when examined, "still greater in reality than in appearance.""
Not only does Hume not have space in this essay to present a full
aesthetic theory, but also, as Townsend emphasizes, he is primarily
involved in a search for exactly what the title states, a standard.
According to Hume, "It is natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a
rule, by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least
a decision, afforded, confirming one sentiment, and condemning
another."" For Hume, the value of the "Standard" obviously lies in its
utility. Setting out to find a way to break free of the quagmire of
relativism of aesthetic judgments, he attempts to explain why, when
" Jones, "Hume's Literary and AestheticTheory," 260.
" David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," in David Hume: Essays; Moral, Political, and
Literary. Edited by Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), 232, and in Jones,
"Hume's Literary and Aesthetic Theory," 260.
"Jones, "Hume's Literary and Aesthetic Theory," 267.
"Jones, "Hume's Literary and Aesthetic Theory," 268.
" Jones, "Hume's Literary and Aesthetic Theory," 273.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 227.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 229.
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faced with two or more judgments about a work, one or more may
simply be poor or wrong.
Hume identifies two clearly different versions of the standard of
taste. The first is the drive to produce a principlesufficient to adjudicate
disputes. The other taste theorists concentrated on the development of
single principles, from Hutcheson's claim that "Uniformity in variety
always makes an object beautiful"" to Kant's theory of taste as based on
the harmonious free play of the cognitive faculties. Hume rejects the
single principle route and follows another instead, dealing with the
confirmation or condemnation of a sentiment." Unlike Hutcheson and
Kant, he does not specify a formula for beauty of objects. Dickie
believes that Hume "sensed the futility of trying to discover a formula
that is necessary and sufficient for the overall beauty of objects."^
On the other hand, Hume rapidly rejects skepticism about taste.
The subjectivity of tastesis unarguable, and variable. As Hume states it,
"According to the disposition of the organs, the same object may be
both sweet and bitter; and the proverb has justly determined it to be
fruitless to dispute concerning tastes."^' But the extension of this to
mental taste is another matter. Hume states that non-disputabihty
"seems to have attained the sanction of common sense,but notes that
it is also opposed by common sense in very obvious cases of comparison
between the products of authors of disproportionate output. Hume's
examples are intended to provide such a contrast as that between
Shakespeare and Barbara Cartland. An equality asserted between the
paired authors is as ludicrous as an equahty asserted between a moun
tain and a molehill. From this, and the common sense rejection of the
opinion of any advocate of such an equality, Hume sums up that "the
principle of the natural equality of tastes is then totally forgot"^' and,
although problems remain when there is a near equality, "it appears an
extravagant paradox, or rather a palpable absurdity, where objects so
disproportioned are compared together."^'*What we have is an intuitive

" Dickie, The Century of Taste, 127.
" Dickie, The Century of Taste,125.
" Dickie, The Century of Taste, 124.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 230.
Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 230.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 231.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 231.
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estimation of the elements of the pairing. The problem of taste, for
Hume as later for Kant, is the resolution of a dilemma, one horn being
non-disputability and the other the obvious disputability of dispropor
tionate pairs.^' The resolution of the dilemma is to reduce the issues of
sentiment to adjudicable issues of fact, and the manner of reduction is
to discover facts about which sentiments are trustworthy, which is, if
not easy, a question it is possible at least at times to answer.
Hume moves into a presentation of his theory with a two part
analysis, involving first the logical nature of principles of taste, and then
discussing specific objects and principles of taste. He rejects rules of
composition fixed a priori. A posteriori, we have general observations
on what has pleased universally, but one cannot produce a rule of
composition from these observations, because, as Hume states, "it
would produce a work, which, by universal experience, has been found
the most insipid and disagreeable."^' The author is restrained by rules
understood by genius or observation. It is also possible for the author
to overcome blemishes in the work by the introduction of beauties.
This works because Hume allows for a plurality of beauty-making
principles, and further allows that there are ways of weighing a work's
beauty-making features and blemishes. It is essential to emphasize that
we do not have a simple triggering feature, a necessary and sufficient
beauty-making characteristic that infallibly enables us to detect beauty.
As Dickie states it, "Hume claims that in criticism we can discover a
number of objects of taste, which he calls 'beauties' and 'blemishes,'
that function as reasons to support evaluations concerning the beauty
and ugliness of works of art."^ Hume, not proposing some one
necessary and sufficient specific feature, instead gives us a partial listing
of characteristics that contribute to an attribution of beauty. These are
neither singly nor in their possible collectivity sufficient for the beauty
of the object.
It seems very clear that Hume doubts that the mere presence of
any one beauty-making feature is sufficient to make an object beautiful,
although this is not ruled out if it is present to a very high degree.
Neither is the presence of a blemish sufficient to condenm a work to

" Kivy, "Hume's Neighbor's 'Wife,'' 203.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of "Taste," 231.
^ Dickie, The Century of Taste,127.
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non-beauty, although it is not impossible. Beauty is "an overall
evaluation of a work of art (or a natural object).,.a threshold phenome
non."^ We respond to, evaluate in terms of, the predominance of the
features both positive and negative, and their relative prominences. An
object can have a large number of beauty-making features and still fail
to be beautiful. Where the beauties outweigh the blemishes, we can
explain our feeling of approbation for the work. We have a pleasurable
sentiment, and judgment identifies the causes of the response, which are
to be found in the actual properties of the work itself. Jones notes that
these "properties are detectable only from certain viewpoints,"^' such
as those which may be made clear to others by competent critics.
"[Cjritics can tell us the cause of an effect one has already felt...only if,
on Hume's view, the antecedent is identifiable, and the relation
repeatable."'° Hence, criteria for the correctness of aesthetic judgments
are not exclusively subjective or objective, but rather intersubjective.^'
This is because there are in fact pleasurable responses. These responses
are to actual properties of the "object" which elicit the pleasurable
response, and the experiences are repeatable. Were they not, the critic
or expert could never identify for us the beautiful features of an object.
The obvious vagaries of response due to fashion, change of locale,
government, religion, language, authority, and prejudice can bestripped
away with time, and one can then derive "certain general principles of
approbation and blame" and find that "Some particular forms or
qualities, from the original structure of the internal fabric, are calculated
to please, and others to displease."'^ When these "fail of their effect in
any particular instance, it is from some apparent defect or imperfection
of the organ."" (My father was tone deaf, and my father-in-law is color
blind, most music and most Abstract Expressionist painting respectively
failing of their effects.) But how is one to know which are the pleasing
and displeasing features, the positive and negative poles of the principle
of taste? Hume notes, after discussing the qualities necessary to the good

" Dickie, The Century of Taste, 130.
® Jones,"Hume's Literary and Aesthetic Theory," 270.
"Jones, "Hume's Literary and Aesthetic Theory," 271.
" A point noted in Susan L. Feagin and Patrick Maynard, Aesthetics (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 340.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 233.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 233.
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critic, that "in reality the difficulty of finding, even in particulars, the
standard of taste, is not so great as represented,"^ and claims that
theories in science, theology, and philosophy are more prone to
overthrow, flatly stating that "nothing has been experienced more liable
to the revolutions of chance and fashion."'' However, "The case is not
the same with the beauties of eloquence and poetry," considering that
"The abstract philosophy of CICERO has lost its credit: The vehe
mence of his oratory is still the object of our admiration."" Hence,
Hume states that although"a civilized nation may easily be mistaken in
the choice of their admired philosopher, they never have been found
long to err, in their affection for a favorite epic or tragic author."'^
One finds that Hume sets out to present a comparison between the
sensitive and insensitive, noting the story of Sancho's kinsmen in Don
Quixote, their great skill in wine tasting, and how their judgments are
confirmed by physical demonstration. Both metallic and leathery
flavors are physically confirmed by the discovery of a key on a leather
thong in the wine keg. The problem here is that there is no clear
analogy to aesthetic judgment, since the correctness of such a judgment
is not physically demonstrable. Hume does not succeed in solving the
problem. "We get, instead, an analysis of the good critic and a descrip
tion of ways in which the insensitive person can be persuaded that a
critic is in fact to be trusted. Typically, it is said that the search for the
standard of taste is Hume's search for the good critic, and that the
standard of taste will be the joint verdict of good critics, hence a way of
resolving disputes. The closest thing to Sancho's kinsmen's key would
be the identifiable work features which the insensitive person acknowl
edges that the critic has successfully pointed out and to which the
person has responded. However, this will only work if such features are
identifiable by means of some definite description. The attempt to
identify features to which an insensitive person may be sensitized is
problematic, because a cognitively insensitive person will remain, de
facto, insensitive. This aspect of Hume's thought is not auspicious, and
may well be, in its ramifications, what Dickie calls "a quixotic quest for

" Hume, *Of the Standard of Taste,' 242.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste,' 242.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 242-243.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste,' 243.
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the nonexistent, artistic equivalent of the key with the leather thong."^'
The key does a couple of things, however. It can let those who lack a
sensitivity know that a quality is present which is beyond the scope of
their sensory apparatus. It can also stimulate those who have a sensitiv
ity to refine it. It will do nothing for a person who whoUy lacks
sensitivity to judge a quality present that the person cannot sense. In the
arts, there is no exact analog for the key in the wine barrel; the most we
can get is agreement among those who have the capacity to detect the
indicated quality that it is there.^' But having conceded the difficulty, it
need not be considered a fatal flaw. That some people may lack
aesthetic sensitivity and that certain categories of art will never do
anjrthing for them I take as a simple fact of life. Hume has his expert
critics practiced and sensitized and informed, but he nowhere claims
that he is dealing with an across-the-board sensitivity, unless it is in the
important category of moral evaluation.
The critic needs strong sense, delicate sentiment, practice in
evaluation, skill at comparison, and freedom from prejudice. Following
the lead of Kivy here, I want to emphasize the elements of good sense
and the intellectual efforts involved in freedom from prejudice. I agree
with the observation of Kivy that "Hume put thought back into the
aesthetic of sentiment.""*® My claim is that to lose the emphasis on
thought in the aesthetic response is to misread Hume. Hume, as we
have clearly seen, would have us transcend vagaries of fashion and
prejudices which lead to divergent opinions. Intellectual effort is
required here, and, following Kivy, I emphasize that delicacy of
sentiment does not play the leading role in Hume's theory. Hume notes
that "our intention in this essay is to mingle some light of the under
standing with the feelings of sentiment."^' Later, Hume says that "a
quick and acute perception of beauty and deformity must be the
perfection of our mental taste.""*^ Not least, he says that "reason, if not
an essential part of taste, is at least requisite to the operations of this
latter faculty.""*^

" Dickie, The Century of Taste, 135.
" George Dickie, Evaluating Art (Pkiladelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 143-144.
* Kivy, "Hume's Neighbor's Wife," 203.
Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste,"234.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 236.
Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 240.
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In regard to both author and audience estimations of appropriate
ness of actions and reactions to circumstances, without a conjunction
of judgment with taste and invention, the author's depiction of such
actions and reactions is doomed to failure. Delicacy of taste, the
sensitivity of the organs of apprehension, is simply not sufficient for a
true judgment. The closest to a trigger stimulus that Hume allows, the
"florid and superficial,"'" loses its hold upon the person whose taste has
been improved and "is rejected with disdain" or "rated at a much lower
value."'*' Any given property we are dealing with has only a possibility
of working as a beauty-making feature. A single given property also
cannot satisfy the requirement for comparison. The true estimation of
complex works is cognitive, for they are characterized as the products
of reason. The organic response is foundational to the perception of
qualities in the work, necessary for anything to be called beautiful.
•Without delicacy of response, there is no taste at all, but there can be
delicacy without taste. It is the cognitive component which moves us
beyond childish responses. As Hume says, "Where good sense is
wanting," the spectator "is not qualified to discern the beauties of design
and reasoning, which are the highest and most excellent."'" The true
Humean critics are identifiable by, in his words, "the soundness of their
understanding and the superiority of their faculties above the rest of
mankind."'^
The objection that Hume simply produces a circular account, with
the standard of taste established by the accepted experts, and the
accepted experts in turn being recognized by their agreement with the
standard of taste is, as Peter Jones points out, simply not in accord with
Hume's theory.'*' Such circularity is only possible when an approved
canon has already been established. A circular theory does not account
for the origins of that canon, nor for evolution in the discernment of
qualities over time. Nor does it allow for reevaluations when moral
codes evolve and works are no longer acceptable because we cannot

" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 238.
Hume, 'Of the Standard of Taste," 238.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 241.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 243.
Peter Jones, "Cause, Reason, and Objeaivityin Hume's Aesthetics," in Donald W. Livingston
and James T. King, eds., Hume: A Re-Evaluation. Edited by(New York: Fordham University
Press, 1976), 274.
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under any circumstances discount the more recently recognized
unpleasantness of behaviors which are explicitly or implicitly endorsed
in the works.
What we are dealing with is not simply a self-reinforcement of
opinions, but a justification of responses to works, with reasons being
given for those responses which will point out the objective characteris
tics in works which will count as beauties or blemishes. There is a point
of view which can be taken up toward art that is available to all who are
not deficient in organic response. As Hume says, "Many men, when left
to themselves, have but a faint and dubious perception of beauty, who
yet are capable of relishing any fine stroke, which is pointed out to
them."'" We have responses, or response potentials, which are part of
the normal human sensory apparatus. We also have cognitive responses
which are educable. We should be able to recognize the beauties in
works, and to discover which critics are the best to instruct us, because
we have fuller responses to works with better instruction. Critics can
point out to us important properties of a work, because we often need
to be taught what to look for. Once we can apprehend the indicated
qualities, the beauty of the work is obvious. What is also obvious is that
we can be mistaken in our initial response. As Hume says it, "Particular
incidents and situations occur, which either throw a false light on the
objects, or hinder the true from conveying to the imagination the
proper sentiment and perception."^® Here, we have an elaboration of
Hume's blemishes, which are weighed against beauties to sort out our
response to the work. As Hume states this, "the force of these beauties
has been able to overpower censure, and give the mind a satisfaction
superior to the disgust arising from the blemishes.""
Famously, Hume allows for variations in the weighting of works
with varying age and life stage, and asserts that there is no blameworthy
feature in this. One can have preferences which conform to one's own
psychological disposition: "We choose our favorite author as we do our
friend, from a conformity of humour and disposition."" There is no
standard of taste for these inclinations, but a generous understanding of

" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 243.
Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 234.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 232.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 244.
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the growth and development of faculties and sentiments that are
common to us all and give hope for a common point of view even as
they allow for differences of interest. Yet it is vital to note that this
moves us not to a sudden collapse into rampant relativism, but to a
simple weighting of positive aesthetic features. This is clearly seen in
Hume's examples of preferences: "conciseness and energy," "a capa
cious, rich, and harmonious expression," "amorous and tender images,"
"wise, philosophical reflections concerning the conduct of life and the
moderation of the passions."®^ We may prefer one feature to another,
but all are given positive evaluations.'"* We do not have anything here
that supports a radical relativism. We have, in Hume's estimation of
works of art, a simple variability of weighting in terms of preference,
which is itself changeable overtime. Hume says of this diversity of taste
that "it leaves no room to give one the preference over the other; in that
case a certain degree of diversity in judgment is unavoidable."" Here, if
the person is faced with a choice between positive aesthetic qualities, the
person will naturally and blamelessly incline toward the work that
exemplifies the qualities which accord with the person's preferences and
stage of life. This is not a radical relativity.
There is a situation, however, in which the beauties of properties
will, over time, become secondary to the evaluation of the object itself
as ugly. Hume writes of works that appear to endorse behavior which
modern readers must consider, in light of evolutions in concepts of
morality, to be unacceptable. As he states it, "where the ideas of
morality and decency alter from one age to another, and where vicious
manners are described, without being marked with the proper charac
ters of blame and disapprobation; this must be allowed to disfigure the
poem, and to be a real deformity."" One simply can not "relish the
composition."'^ This is different from the issue of an author's merely
depicting depraved or grotesque behavior, so long as the presentation
is not endorsing depraved or grotesque behavior. The grotesque or
deformed may be portrayed with exceptional skiU and clarity, hence the
portrayal is beautiful without making the grotesque itself beautiful. The
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 244.
As in Dickie, Evaluating Art, 150-53.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 244.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 246.
" Hume, "Of theStandard of Taste," 246.
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briefest interpretation of Hume's "Of Tragedy" identifies this emphasis
of Hume's on the skill of the author. Hume's answer to the question of
how the audience can get its complex pleasure from tragedy is that
"This extraordinary effect proceeds from that very eloquence, with
which the melancholy scene is represented."'' In cases where total moral
rejection isn't involved, the approbation, or at least the complex
response of pleasure, results from identifiable qualities of authorial
production.
In summary, the response to the object is educable, is a cognitive
response, because it otherwise would not be developed by instruction:
one would never move from a nursery tune to Mozart. Hume notes
that there is a "relation, which nature has placed between the form and
the sentiment."" We discover which works evidence the form by an
examination of the works which have continued to please. This is not
going to produce some universal key, a trigger stimulus that is infallible,
that whenever it is to be met with will give rise to the sentiment.
Rather, it will give us a notion of those objective conditions which may,
in the correct circumstances, elicit the sentiment. All we have to go on
is the set of responses and the situations which are associated with them.
Hume does not hold that there is a sufficient condition for the 'correct'
attribution of beauty to something.
In certain situations, the "thing" which can be perceived as
beautiful can be perceived as such because it has a high degree of utility.
If I am correct in my perception of the "Standard" as having significant
value for aesthetics, I can evaluate it as beautiful. This is because beauty
is a more complex concept to Hume than the references to it that we
find in the "Standard" would imply. Some scholars, notably Carolyn
W. Korsmeyer, have observed that the only way to make sense of what
seem to be leanings toward relativism within an avowed rejection of
relativism in the "Standard" is to consider Hume's aesthetic writings in
this broader context. They believe that the key to consistency is to try
to align his positions on artworks with his more numerous comments
on utility. I concur with this, believe that the approach is essential,
believe that it does not undercut anything that I have said so far, and

" David Hume, "Of Tragedy," in Eugene F. Miller, ed., David Hume; Essays; Moral, Political,
and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), 219.
" Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste," 233.
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indeed believe that is clarifies and expands Hume's aesthetic theory.
Korsmeyer says that there is a"source of aesthetic pleasure about which
Hume speculates throughout his work."'° This source will, Korsmeyer
believes, counter "the objection that his theory is damaged by its lack
of objective grounds for judgments of taste."^' The source of pleasure is
utility, and about utility and beauty Hume has a very great deal to say.
The history of the evaluative term "beauty," and the establishment
of the system of the fine arts as we know them, require a quick
overview because many of Hume's uses of "beauty" were long estab
lished. Paul Oskar Kristeller notes that the Ancients would not
recognize contemporary usages of the word "beauty." Plato refers to
beautiful bodies, habits, and minds, but, Kristeller says, "fails com
pletely to mention works of art."" Indeed, the association between
beauty and the arts "is absent in Plato and secondary in Plotinus and
Augustine."" When beauty is dealt with by Aquinas and other
medievals, it is still not associated with art, but is "treated primarily as
a metaphysical attribute of God and of his creation."" The philosophi
cal distinction between beauty and goodness seems to date to the first
half of the eighteenth century. In what may be considered the first
French treatise of aesthetics, written by de Crousaz in 1714, there is no
limited set of practices which are to count as fine arts. The application
of the word "beauty" is made across a broad spectrum, from mathemat
ics and the sciences to moral virtues and actions, as well as some of the
arts. The set of fine arts that we now recognize was not established until
approximately 1746, and "beauty" was not a word limited to the
individual's response to art. It is Shaftesbury who is credited by
Kristeller with being the "first major philosopher in modern Europe""
to discuss the arts in a fully significant way. But even Shaftesbury "did
not make a clear distinction between artistic and moral beauty.""
Francis Hutcheson, it is claimed, first distinguished between moral and
" Carolyn Korsmeyer, "Hume and the Foundations of Taste," Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism 35 (1976), 211.
" Korsmeyer, "Hume and the Foundations of Taste," 211.
" Paul Oskar Kristeller, "TheModern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of Aesthetics
(I)," Journal of the History ofIdeas 12 (1952), 499.
" Kristeller, "The Modern System of the Arts," 500.
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aesthetic senses of the beautiful.Jerome Stolnitz states that Hutcheson
is the person who "gives impetus to the Copernican revolution in
aesthetics,"'^ and inst^s the percipient "at the center of things;"" his or
her response is said to determine which objects are beautiful. As this
subjectivist theory began to evolve, there arose the fear that no real
limitation on the set of things to be called beautiful could be estab
lished. The word "beautiful" might at worst come to be considered no
more than a general term of approbation.
Such was the situation into which Hume entered with not only the
"Standard," but also other writings in which we find him discussing
beauty. The term had, historically, not been limited to artworks. Even
the complete set of productions and practices that we today consider to
be arts had only recently been established as an approximate class.
Townsend, in observing the wide array of contexts in which Hume held
we could respond aesthetically, refers specifically to their not being
restricted by or to "the emerging concept of fine arts."" Peter Jones
observes that Hume's "Standard" is an extension of his previous work,
especially in the Enquiry Concemingthe Principles of Morals, on the parts
that are played by sentiment and reason in "the realm of values."^° In
this broader scheme, Hume needed to avoid the chaos of relativism
attendant upon any claim of equality of sentiment. Jones states that the
goal of the "Standard" was to present criticism as a "factually based,
rational social activity,"^' which fitted into the entirety of rational
human communication. Sentiment as we have seen is "a criterion,but
neither the only nor the single most significant criterion. Competent
discernment is required. Jones expands the idea that "good sense" is the
most important attribute of the critic," stating that "The Cartesians had
defined good sense as true judgement of sensible things, its role being to
guard against false judgement or prejudice. Hume accepts the point.""
The good sense of the critic attends to four contextual features, two of
''Jerome Stolnitz, "'Beauty': Some Stages in the History of an UerL," Journal of the History of
Ideas
"Stolnitz, "'Beauty'," 201.
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which I highlight: "the ends for which a work has been calculated,"^'
and "the effectiveness of the means to those ends."^' Reason is essential,
because the sentiment of pleasure, or the correct assignment of the
approbational word "beautiful," is dependent upon discernment.
Discernment requires "thinking of the work in particular, determinate,
ways."^
Hixme's aesthetic response, and his use of the word "beauty," is
applied in all of his work in a very broad and rather traditional way.
The semi-delimited use that we find in the "Standard" is not inharmoni
ous with these traditional uses. Hume is very much inclined to the use
of "beauty" as approbational of utility. That the assessment of utility
involves thought, background, and relevant training is in perfect
harmony with what Hume presents in the "Standard" as essential to the
development of the competent critic. Hume, as Townsend claims, held
that "Ideas of utility contribute to the pleasure that makes utility a
source of beauty."^' The traditional equation of beauty with morality
also accords nicely with the "Standard"'s cotmting as blemishes those
features of a work of art which are morally reassessed over the course
of time or are simply always seen to be morally repellent. Townsend,
while holding that there are fundamentally close connections between
Hume's aesthetic and moral perceptions, goes so far as to claim that an
understanding of Hume's "implicit aesthetic is crucial"^ to our
understanding of the manner in which Hume works through his major
philosophical problems. In the following few examples, I shall focus
only on utility, or, in a term of assessment going back to Socrates, the
aspect of beauty that can be called "fittingness."
In Book II of the Treatise, we find Hume's simplest statement
about beauty: it "is such an order and construction of parts, as either by
xkeprimary constitution of our nature, by custom, or by caprice, is fitted
to give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul."'® Hume unambiguously
states that much of the beauty that people admire "is deriv'd from the
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idea of convenience and utility."'' Later in Book 11, Hume indicates that
"The observation of convenience gives pleasure, since convenience is a
beauty," and that this beauty is one "of interest, not of form."'^ This
emphasis on interest is a clear rejection of Hutcheson's version of
disinterested and passive appreciation. Hume, after supplying a sample
listing of such items as tables, chairs, coaches, saddles, and ploughs, then
expands his claim to include "indeed[,] every work of art,"" saying that
"their beauty is chiefly deriv'd from their utility, and from their fitness
for that purpose for which they are destin'd."" He then promptly goes
beyond the artifactual to what may as well be called the biological. The
"principal part of personal beauty," says Hume, "is an air of health and
vigour, and such a construction of members as promises strength and
activity."" But if we wish only to consider formal properties, we find
that Hume speaks of them as formal properties of utihty. These formal
properties can tie utility to an object more than its technical usefulness.
The balance of figures in an artwork is vital, and the improperly
balanced figure is, as Hume puts it, "ugly; because it conveys the
disagreeable ideas of fall, harm, and pain."" This has nothing to do
with the possession or with the use of the artwork for some purpose. In
this sort of case, the evaluation of a work as ugly is a direct result of the
underlying consideration that the depicted body is not going to be able
to perform the functions that one wants a body to perform. Even the
formal estimation of the beauty of prose has a utility of presentation
component, a fitness for speaking. Hume says that "all words or
sentences, which are difficult to the pronunciation, are disagreeable to
the ear."" This is true, he observes, whether the words are spoken aloud
or simply run by the inner ear.
In Book in, we are told that most official art works are considered
beautiful "in proportion to their fitness for the use of man, and even
many of the productions of nature derive their beauty from that
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source."" Hume continues, "Handsome and beautiful, on most
occasions, is not an absolute but a relative quality, and pleases us by
nothing but its tendency to produce an end that is agreeable."" Also in
Book m, Hume says that "where any object, in all its parts, is fitted to
attain any agreeable end, it naturally gives us pleasure, and is esteem'd
beautiful.""' In the Enquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals, when
Hume is discussing the universal and internal sense apparatus of the
species, something that will lead to surprisingly uniform sentiments, he
lists many requirements for the sentiments being properly developed,
and correctly attributed to their object: "Much reasoning should
precede...nice distinctions be made...just conclusions drawn, distant
comparisons formed."" Hume expands the list of requirements and
makes observations about the responses possible in certain circum
stances. Hume then moves to the "finer arts," and emphasizes the point
that "in many orders of beauty, particularly those of the finer arts, it is
reqtiisite to employ much reasoning, in order to feel the proper
sentiment."" To evaluate correctly, one needs to know a vast amount
of information, whether this be a knowledge of the ways that are
appropriate to determine the degree of fertility of a field, or a firm grasp
of the best balance and proportion of a human or animal body. One
cannot say anything about the beauty of the utility of something, its
fittingness, if one doesn't know what the something is and how that
something is to be used. Indeed, in the portion of the second Enquiry
which is dedicated to the question of why utility pleases, a satisfactory
"apology for any disproportion or seeming deformity"" is the demon
strated necessity "of that particular construction for the use intended!""
Hume notes that a ship is "more beautiful"" to an artist or to a person
who knows navigation, if its proportions include a wide prow and a
certain swelling structure of the poop, which are all contradicted by
"Hume,y4 Treatise of Human Nature, 577.
Home, A Treatise of Human Nature, 577.
Home, A Treatise of Human Nature, 584.
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strict geometrical regularity but are functional necessities of the good
boat.
Hume, in Book 11 of the Treatise, as in the second Enquiry, is
interested in the workings of sympathy on the part of the appreciator,
as he sympathizes with the owner of the beautiful chair, house, or
remarkably fertile field. This is essential, since we who are evaluating
and responding to them are not their possessors. After noting that the
examples of utility that he has listed have their values in reference to
their uses, including the profits to be realized from, for example, the
sale of crops, Hume says that "we enter into them by the vivacity of the
fancy, and share them, in some measure, with the proprietor.In the
second Enquiry, Hume says that "Usefulness is agreeable...This is a
matter of fact...But Useful} For what? For somebody's interest...Not
our own, only."'^ Regardless of how remote, we are not completely
indifferent to the situation of the possessor. What we have is a complex
sympathetic reaction. As Hume says, "In every judgement of beauty,
the feelings of the person affected enter into consideration, and
communicate to the spectator similar touches of pain or pleasure."''
Indeed, Hume asks us to "examine any hypothesis by which we can
account for the regard paid to the rich and powerful; we shall find none
satisfactory, but that which derives it from the enjoyment communi
cated to the spectator by the images of prosperity, happiness, ease,
plenty, authority, and the gratification of every appetite."" No notion
of self-love or self-advantage can apply.
Korsmeyer raises the fascinating point that utility as a value to
which we naturally respond is not only evident in Hume's writings, but
it is also an implied justification for the development and the valuing of
taste as such. Korsmeyer presents the person of refined Humean taste
as the person who has developed a balanced and calmly reflective
character. The development of taste allows one avoid the crazes to
which an unsophisticated and hyper-developed sensitivity could lead.
With good taste, one could proceed through life along a "more wellbalanced""" path. Hume speaks precisely of this value to the individual
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in his essay, "Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion." Indeed, Hume
claims that the qualities of fine taste and strong sense are inseparable.'"'
Developed taste, Hume says, strengthens the judgment, and as a result,
he clearly says that "We shall form juster notions of life."'"^ Korsmeyer,
when she writes of this approach, claims that there are, therefore,
"utilitarian reasons why we would be well-advised to develop the kind
of taste that is recognized as refined."'"^ It will lead to a better life in
society. I agree with this, and note Peter Jones's claims that all of
Hume's concerns are with man as a social being. It also seems obvious
to me that, once recognized, this therapeutic value of developed taste,
and the value of the arts that allow us to develop and exercise this taste,
is in surprisingly close harmony with Aristotle's Poetics and the balancerestoring effects of exposure to tragic drama. Good taste is, then, of
great personal and social utility. The arts are not marginalized as useless,
or, as sui generis, isolated in an art-for-arts'-sake ghetto.
Hume's utility, and the interestedness that we find in his estima
tions of beauty, stand in contrast to what we find in later developments,
especially those descending from the work of Kant. Kantian disinterest
edness, which rapidly developed into a pure art for art's sake stance,
proposes a radical disconnection of the art work from the everyday
world. Dickie, in Evaluating Art, says that "the disinterestedness of
beauty is achieved by isolating the experience of beauty from any
anticipated future benefit, and in doing this the beautiful object is
isolated from an3rthing else it stands in relation to, including anything
it might represent."'"* In this approach, the proper response cuts the
work off from anything but itself, rendering it a relationless object.
Hume's approach avoids this, by requiring a contextual understanding
for evaluators and a focus upon what the artist or craftsperson is
attempting to do. Hume doesn't postulate any special aesthetic attitude
that is distinct from ordinary cognition. In this way he can have his
evaluation without isolating the work being evaluated from our beliefs
and sentiments about the world. Beauty is, as an assessment deriving
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from utility, not only pleasurable to the percipient, but of vast social
utility.

